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“Pegging the Singapore dollar to a basket of currencies instead of a fixed rate to the US 
dollar and having a transparent system were claimed by the government of Singapore to have 
enabled the country to weather the Asian financial crisis better. This empirical paper reviews the 
claim by testing the consistency of observed Singapore dollar real exchange rate against the 
country’s key real economic fundamentals. Employing the concept of Natural Real Equilibrium 
Exchange Rate (NATREX), our study finds that the real effective exchange rate has floated 





“Pegging the Singapore dollar to a basket of currencies instead of a fixed rate to the 
US dollar; and having a transparent system have enabled the Republic to weather the Asian 
financial crisis better, said Senior Minister Lew Kuan Yew.” 
 
[The Strait Times, 6
th October 1999] 
 
Despite a series of turbulence events in the world economy and the country’s own 
structural changes in various fronts, Singapore’s economy had successfully maintained a 
remarkable performance during the past three decades. High GDP per capita growth rates, 
driven partly by rapid expansions in trade sector, were achieved while at the same time 
maintaining a relatively modest annual rate of inflation (Table 1A-1C). Most impressively, 
Singapore was one of the few economies in East Asia to have maintained both positive 
growth rate and low inflation at the peak of the East Asian Financial crisis in 1998.
1 
Given the country’s high degree of openness to trade flows where total values of 
export and import averaging around 280% to 400% o f GDP in 1980s and 1990s,
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fluctuations in the domestic currency have significantly influenced the fluctuations in the 
domestic price. Therefore the ability of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) to 
prudently manage the country’s exchange rate policy is arguably one of the key policies 
contributing to the macroeconomic stabilities in general, and the stability of the domestic 
price level in particular (Lu and Yu (1999) and MAS (2000)). Indeed, keeping imported- 
inflation low by letting Singapore dollar to appreciate steadily against its major trading 
partners’ currencies had been the policy anchor of the Monetary Authority of Singapore in 
1980s and 1990s (MAS (2000)). 
However, an active interventionist strategy in managing nominal exchange rate level 
may often create instability elsewhere in the economy, as observed real effective rate fails to 
reflect changes in economic fundamentals (Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)). Calvo et al. (1995) 
have also shown that if observed real exchange rate falls significantly below its equilibrium 
level (an undervaluation of the local currency against major trading partners’ currencies), this 
situation could lead to an inflationary pressure in the domestic economy. Given the 
impressive performance of the macroeconomic indicators of the country, can we, therefore, 
conclude that the exchange rate management in Singapore had indeed been consistent with 
prevailed economic fundamentals and market conditions? 
The objective of this study is to evaluate the performance of the country’s exchange 
rate policy from quarter 1, 1983 to quarter 3, 1993. We pose two narrow but pertinent policy 
questions: 1) to what extent had the real exchange rate been justified by the economic 
fundamentals? and 2) had the Singapore dollar been persistently and significantly misaligned 
(over- or under-valued) from its equilibrium rate ? 
To address those two fundamental questions, our study employs the concept of the 
Natural Real Exchange Rate Equilibrium (NATREX) developed by Stein (1994 and 1996). 
The NATREX  is the equilibrium exchange rate produced by domestic economic 
fundamentals. A currency is misaligned if the observed real exchange rate deviates from its 
NATREX rate. Accordingly, the study will apply the cointegration technique to estimate 
long-run relationship between the fundamental variables and the exchange rate variable. 
Having the theoretically generated equilibrium level of exchange rate, we can address the 
two questions in the paper. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly looks at Singapore’s basic key 
domestic macroeconomic indicators and the country’s exchange rate policy. Section III 
introduces the theoretical model and the empirical model. Data and Empirical tests are 
presented in Section IV. The paper ends with a brief closing remark Section V. 
 
II. Brief Stylized Facts of the Economy and Exchange Rate Policy 
 
1. Brief Stylized Facts 
 
In early to late-1980s, Singapore’s economy experienced an average GDP per capita 
growth rate at about 5% per annum, the slowest among the newly industrialized economies 
in East Asia (Table 1A). The relatively low average growth rate was largely caused by two 
years of economic slowdowns in 1985-1986, driven by global economic recession between 
early- to mid-1980s. During those two years of temporary slowdowns, Singapore’s exports SIREGAR AND HAR: ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS AND MANAGED FLOATING … 
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and imports had contributed only around 20% of the country’s total GDP. In fact, Singapore 
had experienced its only total trade deficit in two decades (1980s and 1990s) in 1986. 
The period of 1990s however saw an impressive economic recovery and sustainable 
economic growth rates in Singapore. The country established itself as one of the fastest 
growing nations in East Asia. Singapore’s GDP growth rate even outpaced those rates of fast 
growing neighboring countries such as Indonesia and Thailand. Significant and persistent 
trade surpluses sustained the rapid growth rate (Table 1A and 1C).   
During the five years period before the break of the East Asian crisis, Singapore was 
experiencing its best years in the past two decades. The G DP grew as fast as 11 percent in 
one year with its maximum annual trade surplus at around 16 percent of GDP. The stability 
of the country’s macroeconomic performance was also remarkable. The standard deviations 
for both GDP per capita growth rate and trade balance were relatively low when compared to 
their means, respectively. In contrast, Korea and Thailand had experienced periods of trade 
balance deficits. Indonesia, Hong Kong and Taiwan, on the other hand, only managed to post 
relatively modest trade balance surpluses between 1992 to 1996 (Table 1C). 
Clearly, Singapore’s ability to manage its inflation rate has been the country’s most 
impressive accomplishment during the past two decades (Table 1B). Between 1980 to 1988, 
Singapore’s inflation rate was averaging above 3 percent per annum. The fluctuations in the 
domestic price level were significant during this period of 1980s, reflected by a relatively 
higher standard deviation with respect to its mean. 
In a sharp contrast, the MAS had successfully suppressed the inflation rate to a mere 
average of 2.3% - 2.9% during the era of the managed appreciation of the Singapore dollar 
(1987-1996). More importantly, the stability of the price level was equally impressive (low 
standard deviation with respect to its mean). Looking at Table 1B, Taiwan was the only 
country that had managed to post an equally outstanding record of inflation rates. 
 
2. Overview of the Exchange Rate Policy 
 
Amid the uncertainty in the world economies in 1972 that led to the floating of the 
Pound Sterling, and the subsequent dismantling of the Sterling Area, Singapore switched its 
parity from Pound Sterling to the US dollar. In June 1973, the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (MAS) led the Singapore dollar to float but keeping active intervention practices 
in the foreign exchange market to keep the Singapore dollar exchange rate float within an 
undisclosed band against a trade-weighted basket of currencies of the country’s major 
trading partners. 
During the past three decades, three key institutions have been playing major roles in 
the management of the Singapore dollar: 1) the Board of Commissioners of Currency of 
Singapore (BCCS, established in 1967), 2) the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS, 
established in 1971), and 3) the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GSIC, 
established in 1981). The first two institutions are largely complementary. The BCCS was set 
up as a currency board authority, responsible for the issue and redemption of the local 
currency. The MAS, in the other hand, plays a role of the central bank (conducts both the 
monetary and exchange rate policies and supervises the financial sector). The last institution, 
the GSIC, manages the investment of the long-term government reserve assets. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Like a conventional currency board, the BCSS is responsible to ensure that the 
currency in circulation is (at least) 100% backed by external assets. The discipline of 
maintaining a high ratio of foreign reserve against domestic monetary aggregates (M1 and 
M2) has been closely maintained. T his prudent practice limits the ability of the MAS to 
expand domestic credit simply by printing money. In turns, this strategy helps instill a high 
degree of market confidence in the local currency. However, unlike the conventional 
currency board regime, there are no pre-announced exchange rates. In fact, the MAS, as a de 
facto central bank, has a large degree of independence to conduct its monetary policy.   
A major shift in the monetary policy took place in early 1980s. The MAS abandoned 
its policy of targeting the level of money supply or interest rate and began to target the 
nominal exchange rate as the anchor of the overall monetary policy of the country. Since 
then, the key objective of the monetary policy is to insulate the economy from the imported 
inflation. The Singapore dollar is allowed to float within an undisclosed target band. The 
central parity/level in the target band is determined by the fluctuations of the currencies of 
the countries that are the main sources of imported inflation and competition in the export 
markets. Neither the central parity nor the band-width is completely fixed, being periodically 
reviewed so as to ensure that they are “consistent with economics fundamentals and market 
conditions” (Williamson (1998)). To illustrate the flexibility of the country’s exchange rate 
policy, the MAS allowed the Singapore dollar to depreciate by about 20 percent during the 
height of the East Asian crisis; while more recently, it is suspected to have intervened 
heavily in the market to prop up the Singapore dollar during the bearishness against regional 
currencies following sharp falls in the NASDAQ (The Straits Times, May 12, 2000). 
 
3. Trends in Effective Exchange Rates and Export Competitiveness 
 
Figures 1 shows close co-movements in the real effective exchange rate (REER) and 
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) of the Singapore dollar. In early 1990s, Singapore 
experienced a much faster nominal appreciation rate than real appreciation. This trend 
reflects how the Singapore’s price level continued to be more and more competitive relative 
to its trading partners’ price levels. The domestic consumer price index grew at a stable and 
modest rate in 1990s (Figure 2). But more importantly, the weighted price index (WTPI) had 
been in a persistent decline since late 1984. The trend in WTPI reflected lower inflation rate 
in the domestic economy compared to most of the trading partners’ rates. The declining rate 
of WTPI contributed to a moderate appreciation trend in the real effective exchange rate, 
despite the managed appreciation policy of the nominal exchange rate. In fact, the real 
effective exchange rate in 1990's was lower than its rate in early 1980s (Figure 1).   
 
III. The Natural Real Equilibrium Exchange Rate (NATREX) 
 
While the preceding discussion of trends in effective exchange rates and macro- 
economic indicators are indicative, it is important to determine consistency of the observed 
real effective exchange rate against the underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Accordingly, we appeal to the c oncept of a Natural Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate 
(NATREX) model developed by Jerome Stein (1994, 1996). The NATREX is the rate that is SIREGAR AND HAR: ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS AND MANAGED FLOATING … 
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determined by the prevailing economic fundamentals in the economy. The model allows us 
to generate an equilibrium benchmark based on an implementable theory (Stein and Paladino 
(1998)). Thus, our equilibrium benchmark is not derived from any atheoretical process. As 
Stein and Paladino (1998) have emphasized, the NATREX model 
 
“is directly amenable to empirical testing, without making any subjective judgment of 
what is: anticipated or unanticipated, permanent or transitory changes.” 
 
The background discussions on the NATREX in this section will be as terse as 
possible. The model is a positive one. It takes government policies as given and do not 
assume that the policy is welfare optimizing one. The natural real equilibrium exchange rate 
is the rate that is determined by real economic fundamentals in the country. The NATREX 
will vary through time depending on the changes in the fundamentals. It is a moving 
equilibrium exchange rate, a complete contrast from the underlying hypothesis of the PPP 
model. Any deviations from that equilibrium rate at any point of time would be considered as 
evidences of the currency’s misalignment. Hence a currency is argued to be misaligned if its 
observed real rate can not be justified by the fundamentals prevailing in the economy. 
 
The basic structural equations of the NATREX model are the followings.
3 
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Note: R = real exchange rate; r = domestic real interest rate; r
* = foreign real interest rate; S 
= saving; I = investment; k = capital stock; F = foreign debt; CA = Current Account; y = 
productivity; u = deviation of rate of capacity utilization;  ) (t r = risk premium; Z = the 
vector of fundamental variables. This vector Z includes mainly real exogenous fundamental 
variables explaining the movements of real exchange rate and current account variable. 
 
Equation (1) is also referred as the macroeconomic balance equation. It states that 
excess investment over saving (I -  S) equals to current account deficit. The equilibrium real 
exchange rate will adjust to ensure that the current account deficit equals to investment (I) 
less saving (S). (I-S) > 0 represents foreign borrowing, and vice versa. Equation (2) is the 
uncovered interest rate parity model with Asymptotically Rational Expectation (Stein 
(1994)). It is basically the portfolio balance equation. Equation (3) and Equation (4) capture 
 
3. Refer to Stein (1994 and 1996) for more detail analysis on the theory part of the model. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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the changes in the foreign debt level and the investment level respectively over the period.   
In short, the NATREX model adds dynamic stock - flow interactions (Equation (3) and 
(4)) to the standard macroeconomic approach balance model. The inclusion of the dynamic 
equations allows the NATREX to vary over time, reflecting the changes on the fundamental 
variables. In the medium -run, an economy may face an imbalance level of current account. 
In the long-run, however, the foreign debt and capital stabilize. The evolution of the real 
exchange rate under the NATREX model can therefore be captured as: 
 
  ] [ /  dZ/dt R  dF/dt R  dk/dt R   dt  dR z F k + + =                                 (5) 
 
where  k R ,  F R , and  z R  are partial derivatives with respect to capital, debt, and 
fundamental variables, respectively. 
Given k and F are functions of the fundamental variables (Z) - see Equation (1) and 
Equation ( 4), the trajectory of the real exchange rate under this model can therefore be 
expressed in terms of the fundamental variables. 
 
] / ) / ( / ) / [( / / dZ dF F R dZ +  dk k R + Z R = dZ dR ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶                       (6) 
 
where  Z R ¶ ¶ /  is direct effect of the fundamental variables to the real exchange rate 
variable.    dZ dk k R/ ] / ) [( ¶ ¶ and  ] / ) / [( dZ dF F R ¶ ¶  are the effects of fundamental variables 
to the real exchange rate through their impacts on k and F (indirect effects).   
In summary, the impacts of the fundamental variables on the trajectory of the real 
exchange rate under the NATREX model can be explained through a direct and an indirect 
way. What is important for the empirical application of the model is to find the appropriate 
set of fundamental variables included in vector ( t Z ). For most applications of the NATREX, 
the vector ( t Z ) includes the terms of trade, productivity variable, world interest rate and 
saving/expenditure. 
 
1. Single Equation Estimation
4 
 
We refer to the real exchange rate determined by real fundamental variables in the 
economy as the natural equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER). The general working model 
of the ERER is the following single-equation econometric model: 
 
) ( t t  z  f    erer =                                                        (7) 
 
where  t z  is a vector of economic fundamentals: {g, 
* r , prd, tot and pol}. Small letters 
represent natural logs. g is real government spending, 
* r  is world real interest rate, prd is 
productivity, tot is terms of trade and pol is a dummy variable. These variables capture open 
 
4. The use of the single -equation estimation can be commonly found in most of the recent studies (see Edwards and 
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economy properties of Singapore that rely heavily on international trade (tot) and financial 
sector (
* r ). In addition, the economic performance of the country depends heavily on its 
high total factor productivity ( prd), facilitated largely by active government expenditure 
policy ( g). This set of selected variables has also been quite commonly accepted as 
exogenous fundamental determinants of the real exchange rate movements in earlier 
empirical studies (Edwards and Savastano (1999)). 
 
To estimate erer, we regress the following equation (Equation (8)): 
 
t t t t t t t t pol tot prd r g reer e b b b b b b b + + + + + + + = 6 5 4 3
*
2 1 0                     (8) 
 
Variables ( g, 
* r , prd and tot) are defined before.  reer is a natural log of observed real 
effective exchange rate (REER), and t is a time-trend variable. Equation (8) is seeking the 
best fit of the REER on the country’s relevant exogenous economic fundamentals.  0 b  and 
t e  are constant and error term respectively. A time trend (t) is added to capture the effects of 
missing fundamentals such as capital stock (Montiel (1997)). A dummy variable pol is also 
introduced to capture a sudden change in the REER trend from a depreciating one to an 
appreciating one in mid-1980’s (Figure 1).
5 Using the coefficient estimates obtained from 
regressing Equation (8) , we construct the equilibrium effective exchange rate (erer). 
What The Theories Say About Coefficient  b ’s Based on the basic concepts of 
Mundell-Fleming open economy IS-LM model, a rise (a decline) in the ratio of government 
consumption of tradable will result in a balance of payment surplus (deficit). In turn, the 
payment surplus (deficit) will appreciate (depreciate) the local currency. Thus,  0 1 > b . 
When the return for foreign currency dominated assets (
* r ) rises beyond that of local 
currency dominated assets (r), investors shift its portfolio away from local assets to foreign 
assets. Given everything else remains the same, the real rate of Singapore dollar depreciates. 
This concept of interest rate parity theory implies that  0 2 < b . 
A rise in local productivity and in terms of trade raises capital intensity/investment. 
The country experiences an improvement in the balance of payment, which eventually 
appreciates the domestic currency. Thus  3 b  and  4 b  are positive. 
 




The data set covers the period of quarter 1, 1983 to quarter 3, 1999. REER is obtained 
from J.P. Morgan’s real effective exchange rate index series. This index captures real 
effective exchange rate of Singapore dollar against its 22 major trading partners. 
 
5. A combination of the policy shift in the management of the Singapore d ollar (to managed appreciation) and other 
factors such as the global depression during the early-to-mid-1980’s were responsible for the sudden shift in the 
NEER and REER trend of the Singapore dollar. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Three-month U.S. dollar libor rate (adjusted by annualized U.S. consumer price) and terms 
of trade data (direct price of export / direct price of import) are obtained from IFS, IMF 
(various years). Productivity index (gross domestic product per capita) and real government 
expenditure data (adjusted by GDP deflator) are collected from Yearbook of Statistics, 
Singapore (various years). Dummy variable ( pol) equals to zero from quarter 1, 1983 to 
quarter 2, 1986 and to one, otherwise. 
 
2. Empirical Tests 
 
To test the properties of the relevant series, the ADF Unit-Root test will be conducted 
on all relevant variables. We will then test for any presence of long-run relationship among 
those variables in Equation (8). The Johansen Maximum Likelihood Cointegration test will 
be applied to evaluate the cointegration relationship.   
 
Unit-Root Test To determine the order of integration of each variable, we use the 









1 3 2 1                                     (9) 
 
where X = {reer, tot, g, 
* r , prd, pol} with all variables in logs, and t is the time trend. The 
ADF test shows that all the variables are integrated of order 1 (Table 2). The Akaike Criteria 
test determines the appropriate number of lag periods. 
However, given the potential presence of structural breaks in many time-series 
variables, the low-power of A DF test may not be sensitive enough to differentiate a 
stationary series from that of a non-stationary series. To evaluate the unit-root property more 
structurally, we apply another unit-root test introduced by Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock 
((BLS), 1992). Their work investigates further the possibility that aggregate economic time 
series can be characterized as being stationary around “a single or multiple structural breaks”. 
Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock extend the Dickey-Fuller t  test by constructing the 
time-series of rollingly computed estimators and their t statistics. 
For the BLS Unit-Root test, we report the unit-root test at the level. Both the minimal 
and maximal Dickey-Fuller  t test statistics of the BLS rolling test are found to be 
significantly larger than each critical value, respectively (Table 3). These test results confirm 
the findings of the ADF tests that the null hypothesis of nonstationarity at 5% critical value 
can not be rejected at the level for all the key variables.
6 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Test. Given all variables are I(1), we 
apply the Johansen full information maximum likelihood procedure to Equation (8). The 
likelihood ratio test indicates that there is one cointegrating equation at 5% significance level 
 
6. The BLS rolling unit-root test results at the first difference for all variables are found to be significantly smaller 
than their respected 5% critical values. Hence all variables are found to be I(1), confirming the ADF test-results. 
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(Table 4). The size and sign of estimates for each coefficient are both significant and 
consistent with the theory. 
Consistent with the characteristics of the domestic economy, our results show that two 
most influential variables in explaining the fluctuations of the real effective exchange rate of 
the Singapore dollar are the productivity rate (prd) and the world interest rate (
* r ). In 1990s, 
Singapore’s overall productivity level has been rated among the best in the world. The World 
Competitiveness Yearbook (2000) listed Singapore as the second most competitive country, 
based on its national productivity level and other indicators, in the world (second only to the 
United States). In addition, with the rapid development of the financial sector in the country, 
particularly since early 1980s, the Singapore dollar is expected to be sensitive to the 
fluctuations in the returns of foreign assets. 
Using the estimated coefficients, we calculate erer (Figure 3). The positive (negative) 
difference (misalignment) between the reer and the erer captures the measured overvaluation 
(undervaluation) of the Singapore dollar. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that the reer had not 
been persistently and significantly misaligned from its  erer, except during the world 
recession (1985-1986). Even during the 1997-1999 financial crisis period, the  reer was 
undervalued at most by only less than 2%. 
Has the policy been a stable one, particularly since mid-1980s when the MAS let the 
Singapore dollar to appreciate gradually? The r egime can be considered stable if its 
misalignment rate is found to be a stationary series (I(0)). In another words, if reer has been 
a stable rate, then we should find reer to be cointegrated with the economic fundamentals 
during the sub-period of quarter 1, 1987 to quarter 3, 1999.   
To evaluate the stability of the reer series, we conduct another cointegration test on 
Equation 8, excluding variable pol.
7 The cointegration test result is posted in Table 5. We 
find one cointegration vector at 5% significance level. We can, therefore, conclude that the 
managed appreciation policy adopted between 1987-1997 and the more flexible regime of 
the exchange rate policy since 1998, have successfully kept the observed real effective 
exchange rate of the Singapore dollar to be cointegrated with the domestic economy’s real 
fundamentals, i.e., the policies have been a stable set.   
 
V. Brief Concluding Remarks 
 
Our study has shown that the observed real effective exchange rate of the Singapore 
dollar had mostly floated around its natural real equilibrium exchange rate (NATREX), albeit 
periods of moderate misalignments. After the turbulent period of early-to mid-1980s, the 
policy of managed appreciation of the Singapore dollar had successfully kept the real 
effective exchange rate consistent with the fundamentals in the economy during a decade 
before the break of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 (Table 6). Looking at several key 
macroeconomic indicators, outstanding performances were reported during the 1987-1996 
period when there was a modest rate of under-valuation with the Singapore dollar. In general, 
rapid GDP per capita growth rates and low unemployment rates were accompanied by 
 
7. The dummy variable pol is no longer relevant as we are only focusing on the period starting 1987. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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moderate inflation rates. 
Even during the peak of the East Asian financial crisis (1997-1998), the level of 
misalignment was relatively moderate (less than 1%). The weak demand in the economy and 
the region had lowered the country’s inflation rate. But the overall unemployment rate 
remained stable at 2.8%, and the economy still managed to push for 2.6% annual growth rate 
of the GDP per capita. Devereux (1998) attributes the overall performance of the Singapore 
economy during the crisis period to the country’s management of the local currency. The 
study argues that the exchange rate policy in Singapore was more effective in insulating the 
domestic economy from foreign price shocks than the currency board system in Hong Kong 
was during the crisis. Clearly, the empirical findings in our study confirm the overall 
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Table 1A   GDP Per Capita Growth Rate in (%) 
  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Standard Deviation 
Period: 1980-1988         
Hong Kong  6.18  11.82  -0.64  3.99 
Korea  6.39  9.95  -3.61  4.27 
Taiwan  6.59  11.49  1.74  3.25 
Singapore  5.34  9.72  -3.16  4.03 
Indonesia  4.12  6.52  -0.80  2.43 
Thailand  4.86  11.41  2.90  2.85 
Period: 1989-1997         
Hong Kong  3.05  5.37  1.50  1.33 
Korea  6.04  8.22  3.99  1.65 
Taiwan  5.58  7.14  4.12  0.88 
Singapore  6.86  10.56  4.46  2.02 
Indonesia  5.94  7.19  3.12  1.27 
Thailand  6.37  10.28  -2.72  3.75 
Period: 1992-1996         
Hong Kong  3.30  5.37  1.86  1.53 
Korea  5.88  7.61  4.48  1.49 
Taiwan  5.34  5.76  4.85  0.37 
Singapore  7.17  10.56  4.46  2.61 
Indonesia  5.80  6.49  5.40  0.43 
Thailand  6.76  7.74  4.86  1.17 
Source: ICSEAD (2000). SIREGAR AND HAR: ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS AND MANAGED FLOATING … 
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Table 1B  Inflation Rate (%): Percentage Change of the GDP Deflator Index 
  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Standard Deviation 
Period: 1980-1988         
Hong Kong  8.58  15.22  3.87  3.52 
Korea  9.25  24.11  4.71  6.78 
Taiwan  4.44  16.20  0.56  5.69 
Singapore  3.31  11.45  -2.35  4.34 
Indonesia  11.35  30.99  -0.15  8.93 
Thailand  5.08  12.71  1.45  3.63 
Period: 1989-1997         
Hong Kong  7.74  12.25  2.56  2.70 
Korea  6.99  10.86  3.15  2.53 
Taiwan  2.97  3.93  1.85  0.89 
Singapore  2.93  4.81  1.14  1.39 
Indonesia  8.85  12.57  5.36  1.96 
Thailand  4.97  6.12  3.32  0.98 
Period: 1992-1996         
Hong Kong  6.71  9.71  2.56  2.74 
Korea  6.67  7.66  3.89  1.58 
Taiwan  2.79  3.93  1.89  0.92 
Singapore  2.32  3.27  1.14  0.95 
Indonesia  8.12  9.88  5.36  1.71 
Thailand  4.54  5.75  3.32  0.97 
Source: ICSEAD (2000). JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Table 1C   Trade Balance as % of GDP 
  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Standard Deviation 
Period: 1980-1988         
Hong Kong  4.66  9.88  -2.08  5.03 
Korea  0.84  7.94  -7.42  5.48 
Taiwan  9.72  19.79  -1.19  6.89 
Singapore  -1.96  7.12  -8.76  4.44 
Indonesia  2.30  8.29  -1.00  2.73 
Thailand  -3.02  2.03  -7.16  3.21 
Period: 1989-1997         
Hong Kong  3.43  11.51  -4.34  5.64 
Korea  1.18  2.71  -4.11  1.89 
Taiwan  3.49  7.50  1.89  1.92 
Singapore  11.19  15.58  6.92  3.19 
Indonesia  1.19  2.98  -1.34  1.62 
Thailand  -4.54  1.39  -7.52  2.76 
Period: 1992-1996         
Hong Kong  1.57  7.03  -4.34  4.69 
Korea  -1.63  0.05  -4.11  1.52 
Taiwan  2.34  3.84  1.89  0.84 
Singapore  12.40  15.58  7.90  3.37 
Indonesia  1.02  2.98  -1.34  1.98 
Thailand  -5.12  -3.74  -6.73  1.34 
Source: ICSEAD (2000). SIREGAR AND HAR: ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS AND MANAGED FLOATING … 
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Table 2  ADF Unit-Root Test 
Variable 
ADF Test-Statistics 
(At the Level) 
ADF Test-Statistics 
(At the First Difference) 
Reer  -1.548  -3.721 
Pol  -1.6638  -5.8753 
r
*  -1.7015  -4.5629 
Prd  -3.0896  -9.9580 
Tot  -2.733  -6.609 
G  -1.938  -6.606 
All variables are tested to be integrated of order 1 at 5% critical value. 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) 
Variable  # of Lags  At the Level  At the First Difference 
reer  1 (1)
b  -7.8149  -7.8254 
pol  1 (1)  -4.1589  -4.1168 
r
*  1 (1)  -4.3792  -4.3741 
prd  1 (1)  -7.8859  -8.2200 
tot  2 (1)  -7.176  -7.121 
g  3 (1)  -3.097  -3.040 
b/ (   ) captures the number of lags for the variable at its first difference. 
 
Table 3   The BLS Rolling Unit-Root Test 
Variable 

























BLS’s Critical values at 5% (for the sample size up to 100): 
                      (1). the maximum: -1.49 
                      (2). the minimum: -5.01 
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Table 4   JOHANSEN Cointegration Test 
Period: 1983:01 to 1999:03 
Observations: 67 
# of Lags: 1 
Eigenvalue  Likelihood Ratio  5% Critical Value 
0.4247  122.16
a  114.91 
0.4066  85.11
a  87.31 
0.2922  50.15
a  62.99 
0.2397  27.00
a  42.44 
0.0696  8.65
a  25.32 
0.0553  3.81
a  12.25 
a/ 1 cointegrating equation at 5% significance level. 
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 
reer = -7.576 - 0.261 pol + 0.154 g - 0.066 r
* + 1.441 prd + 0.519 tot - 0.012 t 
(0.035)     (0.053)   (0.024)   (0.246)     (0.270)   (0.003) 
( ) are the standard errors; coefficient estimates are significant at 5% level. 
 
Table 5   Stability Test based on Johansen Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Test 
(Period: Quarter 1, 1987 - Quarter 3, 1999) 
Eigenvalue  Likelihood Ratio  5 Percent Critical Value 
Hypothesized No. of 
Cointegrating Vector(s) 
0.6015  105.836
a  87.31  None 
0.3958  58.908
a  62.99  At most 1 
0.2803  33.212
a  42.44  At most 2 
0.2249  16.437
a  25.32  At most 3 
0.0653  3.445
a  12.25  At most 4 
a/ Likelihood Ratio indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% significance level. 
 
Table 6   Misalignment Rates and Selected Key Macroeconomic Indicators 
(Annual Average in %)  1980 - 1986  1987 - 1996  1997 - 1998 
Unemployment Rate
*  3.63%  2.78%  2.83% 
GDP per capita Growth Rate
*  4.30%  7.29%  2.59% 
Inflation Rate
*  3.34%  3.14%  0.15% 
Misalignment Rate
** 








*) Yearbook of Statistics, Singapore and ICSEAD (2000). 
(
**) Authors’ own calculations. SIREGAR AND HAR: ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS AND MANAGED FLOATING … 
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Note: A rise in the index implies an appreciation of the Singapore dollar against the country’s major trading 
partners’ currencies. 
Source: IFS, IMF (various years) and J.P. Morgan exchange rate index series. 
 
Figure 1  Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER)   
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Source: IFS, IMF (various years). 
 
Figure 2   Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Weighted Price Index (WTPI) (1995=100) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 












Figure 3   REER and NATREX (Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate (ERER)) 
















Note: Misalignment rate = ((REER – NATREX) / NATREX) * 100 
A positive (negative) misalignment rate implies an overvaluation (undervaluation) of the Singapore dollar. 
 
Figure 4   Misalignment Rate (in %) 